Privatization of Mexico\u27s public enterprises and the restructuring of the private sector by Hoshino Taeko
Privatization of Mexico's public enterprises
and the restructuring of the private sector
権利 Copyrights 日本貿易振興機構（ジェトロ）アジア
経済研究所 / Institute of Developing
Economies, Japan External Trade Organization
(IDE-JETRO) http://www.ide.go.jp
journal or
publication title
The Developing Economies
volume 34
number 1
page range 34-60
year 1996-03
出版者 Institute of Developing Economies
URL http://hdl.handle.net/2344/239
The Developing Economies, XXXIV-1 (March 1996)
PRIVATIZATION OF MEXICO’S PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND
THE RESTRUCTURING OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
TAEKO HOSHINO
I. INTRODUCTION
HE decade of the 1980s was of historic significance in the development of
Mexico’s economy. The economic crisis brought on by the country’s
external debt problem which surfaced in 1982 compelled the government to
abandon its long-standing development strategy. It totally reversed course, swing-
ing 180 degrees away from its strategy of industrialization through import substitu-
tion characterized by protected domestic markets, controls on foreign direct invest-
ment, and the active participation of government in the economy, and turned to a
development strategy based on neo-liberal principles of trade liberalization, the
easing of controls on foreign investment, and the wholesale withdrawal of govern-
ment participation in the economy. Following this complete about-face in eco-
nomic strategy, the Mexican economy experienced a transformation of unprec-
edented scale, a process still ongoing today.
This study will focus on the policy of privatizing the public enterprises, which
was one part of the Mexican government’s new strategy for dealing with its mas-
sive deficit. At the same time it will explore the relationship between this policy
and the remarkable restructuring of the private sector which took place within the
transformation of Mexico’s economy during the 1980s. A central part of the exami-
nation of this privatization policy is an analysis of the entrepreneurs and investors
who acquired the public enterprises and became the prime actors who carried for-
ward the process of privatization. These themes have been selected for examina-
tion for the following reasons.
Firstly, the reason for exploring the relationship between privatization and the
restructuring of the private sector is because of the extremely close relationship
between the privatization of public enterprises and the restructuring of the private
sector. As will be seen later in this study, there was an extremely dynamic relation-
ship between the two with private sector restructuring (which began with the na-
tionalization of the banks in 1982) helping to prepare the way for privatization,
while at the same time privatization kept pushing along the restructuring of the
private sector. Just how important this interaction has been becomes clear particu-
T
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larly when the progress Mexico has made in its privatization program is compared
with that of other countries. Mexico stood fourth in the world, behind only En-
gland, Germany, and Japan, in the amount of revenues it earned from the sale of
public enterprises between 1988 and 1992. Among developing countries it stands
far and away at the top [15, p. 15].1 Thus this author sees the aforementioned dy-
namic relationship between privatization and the restructuring of the private sector
as an important factor for the successful results, even from an international per-
spective, that Mexico has achieved in its program of privatization.
Secondly, the reason for concentrating analysis on the entrepreneurs and inves-
tors who were the prime actors of privatization is because they bring out most
clearly the interaction between privatization and the restructuring of the private
sector. This study will examine who acquired what enterprises and why, and what
the backgrounds of these people were; it will then examine how these people were
involved in the overall economic activity of the 1980s. In this way the components
of the aforementioned “dynamic relationship” between privatization and restruc-
turing can be exhibited more clearly. Moreover, an analysis of the prime actors of
Mexico’s privatization process is important for a better understanding of Mexico’s
economy since going through privatization. Privatization brought about the expan-
sion of the private sector, and entrepreneurs and investors who acquired public
enterprises can be expected to play leading roles in this newly expanded private
sector. By paying attention to these people, the state of the Mexican economy fol-
lowing privatization can be more clearly understood.
The remainder of this study is composed of the following sections: Section II
presents a summary of Mexico’s privatization program; Section III examines the
entrepreneurs and enterprises that acquired the large-scale public enterprises; Sec-
tion IV examines the relationship between the privatization process and the restruc-
turing of the private sector while also looking into the backgrounds of the people
examined in Section III; and Section V sets forth the conclusions of this study, and
the significance of Mexico’s privatization program in the restructuring of its pri-
vate sector.
1 The author was unable to obtain figures for 1987 or earlier. According to Schwartz and Silva Lopes
[15], privatization of public enterprises in developing countries progressed rapidly during the
1988–92 period. The privatization of public enterprises has now become a worldwide trend, but
the initial moves in this direction were first taken in England in the early 1980s under the Thatcher
government. Thereafter in the mid-1980s, privatization also began to take place in the United
States, Japan, and the advanced countries of Europe (see [17]). When seen in relation to this world-
wide trend, Mexico had achieved outstanding results in privatization through the sale of public
enterprises even prior to 1987, and this was especially true when compared with other developing
countries.
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II. SUMMARY OF MEXICO’S PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
Three points of Mexico’s privatization program will be summarized in this section:
(1) the withdrawal of the federal government from production of goods and ser-
vices; (2) the effect of privatization on the federal government’s financial affairs;
and (3) the speed at which privatization was carried out.
A. The Federal Government’s Withdrawal from Productive Activities
Under its policy of import substitution, the Mexican government had taken an
active part in the country’s productive activities of goods and services, and public
enterprises came to be the primary operators in these fields of business. These en-
terprises became involved in a vast range of industries which included oil well
drilling and refining, mining, electric power, sea food processing, sugar refining,
fertilizer production, primary petrochemicals, iron and steel, automobiles, rail-
roads and railroad car manufacturing, telephone operations, airline services, streets
and roads, and processing and distribution of basic consumer goods. In some of
these businesses public enterprises held a monopoly [16, p. 73] [10, pp. 120–21] [3,
pp. 156–74]. Under such economic conditions, privatization brought about pro-
found changes.
Privatization was not formulated as a separate self-contained policy. It was one
of the methods undertaken as part of a larger policy for detaching public enterprises
from the government. Other methods used were liquidation, termination, integra-
tion, and transfer. In 1982 there were 1,155 public enterprises in existence. From
that year until March 1989, about 30 per cent of 790 public enterprises that the
federal government approved for divestiture were separated through privatization
[5, April 24, 1989]. A noteworthy feature of the public enterprises that were sub-
jected to privatization was the large number that were large-scale enterprises.
There were two reasons for this. One was the favorable effect that the sale of these
enterprises would have on government finances, on government employment
policy, and for the assuring of stable production. This made privatization an ap-
pealing method for the government to divest itself of public enterprises. The sec-
ond reason was that many of these large-scale enterprises were leading companies
in their respective business sectors, and it was expected that it would be easy to get
buyers for these companies. To date most of the enterprises in the fields of business
listed in the above paragraph have been privatized and moved over to the private
sector. The only exceptions have been oil well drilling and refining and electric
power, and there are no plans at present to privatize the businesses in these fields.
B. Recovery of Federal Government Finances
Along with the restructuring discussed above, another important objective in the
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privatization policy was to stabilize the economy through reduction of the
government’s debt. After 1982 the government deficit rose sharply due to the fall in
revenue from petroleum exports and the increase in the government’s debt repay-
ment burden. To repress inflation and stabilize the exchange rate, the government
had to reduce its debt. It was expected that the securing of revenues from the sale of
the large-scale enterprises and the reduction of expenditures through the shedding
the unprofitable enterprises would contribute to reducing the debt, and this expec-
tation was in fact realized.
During the Salinas government, the revenues secured from the sale of public
enterprises were deposited in a contingency fund (fondo de contingencia). The
government stated that from December 1990 to June 1993, a total of 57.5 billion
new pesos in revenues from sales were deposited into the contingency fund. When
calculated at U.S.$ 1 = 3,177.56 old pesos which was the average exchange rate on
the open market in December 1992, this amount came to around U.S.$ 18.1 billion.
The 57.5 billion figure could be broken down into 38.9 billion new pesos in pay-
ment for privatized banks (equal to U.S.$ 12.2 billion), 14.9 billion new pesos for
Teléfonos de México (TELMEX) (U.S.$ 4.7 billion), 1.9 billion new pesos for
other enterprises (U.S.$ 600 million), and 1.9 billion new pesos in revenue from
interest (U.S.$ 600 million) [5, July 24, 1993]. These figures are for only part of the
period of the Salinas government and do not include those for the time of the de la
Madrid government. Thus it can be presumed that total revenues from privatization
rather exceed the 57.5 billion new pesos figure.2 Concerning the method of pay-
ment, the Mexican government could have used bonds issued for repayment of the
public external debt, meaning that it could have capitalized the debt. Argentina
took this course and capitalized a huge part of its debt.3 But considering the large
amount that has been deposited into Mexico’s contingency fund, it would appear
that the capitalization of its debt has not been so large. The greater part of the
amount held in the contingency fund has been allocated to repaying the principal
and interest on the country’s domestic and external debt [13, p. 129].
C. Rapid Advance of Privatization under the Salinas Government
The policy of divesting public enterprises was implemented from around the
mid-1980s, but large-scale public enterprises in particular began to undergo rapid
privatization from December 1987. At that time, according to Lustig, it was an-
nounced that the sectors where government ownership and control would be re-
tained were petroleum exploration, well drilling, and refining, primary petrochemi-
cals, electric power, railroads, and the distribution of basic foodstuffs; at the same
2 For example, the total proceeds just from the sales of Nos. 3, 4, and 8 (Trigo Industrializado
CONASUPO) in Table I on pp. 40–45, which were carried out from June 1993, came to 4.2 billion
new pesos (U.S.$ 1.3 billion) [5, July 19, 1993] [5, September 20, 1993] [5, October 4, 1993].
3 See [11] [14].
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time it was tacitly implied that the government would withdraw from such fields as
telephone operations, airline services, iron and steel, transportation equipment,
chemicals and fertilizers, mining, and sugar refining [8, p. 107].
The reason for coming out with a plan at this time to broaden divestiture to
include large-scale public enterprises was due to the political and economic condi-
tions that prevailed during the latter half of the 1980s. In 1985 international petro-
leum prices dropped sharply, and in September of that year Mexico suffered a large
earthquake; both of these events increased the strain on the federal government’s
already straitened financial circumstances. Also during that time there was a
change in the power balance within the government between the faction pushing
for privatization and that advocating a slower more caution approach. The nomina-
tion in October 1987 of Salinas, an advocate of privatization, as candidate to be the
next president apparently strengthened the influence of the faction promoting
privatization.4 Yet another factor was the progress in the restructuring of the pri-
vate sector which came to be the prime actor of the privatization process. As will be
shown later, the nationalization of the banks at the start of the 1980s and the boom
of investment in securities during the latter half of that decade spurred the restruc-
turing of the private sector and helped in preparing the way for the privatization
process. In other words, had there not been the securities boom, the implementation
of privatization would have been difficult because of insufficient liquidity on the
part of the buyers.
III. ACQUISITIONS OF LARGE-SCALE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
Table I shows the large-scale public enterprises (excluding banks) that were
privatized and the entities that acquired them. The “acquiring entities” shown in the
table are the names of the individuals and enterprises that acquired public enter-
prises as announced by the government. The enterprises put up for acquisition in-
clude preexisting enterprises as well as new ones set up specifically for
privatization. For the newly established enterprises, the table shows the capital sub-
scribers and subscribing enterprises to the extent that these have been made known;
these are shown in the column labeled “primary subscribers or subscribing enter-
prises in the acquiring entities.” Table II shows the banks that have been privatized
and the names of the representatives of the individuals or enterprises that made the
acquisitions as announced by the government. Subsection A below will discuss the
investors that acquired of the large-scale public enterprises, while Subsection B
will deal briefly with those that acquired the nationalized banks.
4 Salinas, who held the post of Secretary of Programing and Budget in the de la Madrid government,
essentially represented the faction promoting privatization, while Francisco Labastida Ochoa, who
was Secretary of Energy, Mines and State Industries, represented the faction advocating caution
[12, June 2, 1986, p. 10].
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A. Acquisitions of Large-Scale Public Enterprises
This subsection will begin by examining the importance of foreign investment in
the acquisition of Mexico’s privatized public enterprises. Among the enterprises
listed in Table I, it is possible to ascertain those that were acquired solely by foreign
investment. The only acquisitions in this category are: No. 6 where an Indian com-
pany (Grupo Caribbean Ispat) acquired a portion of the plants only, No. 8 where a
multinational (Unilever) acquired a portion of the plants only, No. 15 where an
Australian company (Kelpie Industries de México) acquired one subsidiary only,
No. 19 acquired by a Canadian company (Bombardier), No. 27 acquired by two
Japanese companies (Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co. and Sumitomo Corp.) who were
already minority shareholders before privatization, and No. 30 acquired by an
American company (Grupo Sonoco de México).
With the coming of privatization, a consortium of entrepreneurial investors was
organized (which will be noted later), and this group ascertained that the following
acquisitions were carried out with the participation of foreign investment: No. 1
with American (South Western Bell) and French (France Cable and Radio) partici-
pation, No. 5 with Belgian (Union Miniere) participation, No. 6 with American
(Coutinho Caro Co.) participation, No. 11 with Dutch (Hoogovens) and American
(Mission Energy Co.) participation, and No. 13 with the participation of an Ameri-
can bank (Chase Manhattan Bank) and an individual investor (James Goldsmith).
But in all of these cases, the majority of the subscribed capital was provided by
Mexican investors. Thus it can be said that the importance of foreign investment in
the acquisition of Mexico’s public enterprises has not been very big. This contra-
dicts the claims of Petrazzini who examined a number of acquisitions of privatized
Mexican public enterprises and emphasized the importance of foreign investment
in these acquisitions. His findings, however, were biased because all four ex-
amples, Nos. 1, 13, 19, and 27, that he studied happen to have foreign investment
participation [11, pp. 61–66]. From an overall perspective, the overwhelming ma-
jority of acquisitions of public enterprises have been by Mexican investors.
There are two reasons why Mexican investors have been the principal buyers of
public enterprises. One is that while restrictions on foreign capital participation
have been greatly eased when compared with the era before privatization, in some
specific industries these restrictions still remain.5 This is in contrast with Argentina
which has made preferential arrangements for the participation of foreign investors
5 The Regulation of the Law Promoting Mexican Investment and Regulating Foreign Investment,
promulgated in May 1989, stipulates that (among the industries listed in Table I) no foreign invest-
ment is allowed in airline companies, television broadcasting, insurance, or gasoline stations; for-
eign investment can be up to 34 per cent in coal, iron ore and phosphorus mining and refining; it
can be up to 40 per cent in secondary petrochemicals, automobiles and automotive parts; and up to
49 per cent in the fishing industry, copper mining and smelting, and telephone services.
TABLE I
ENTITIES THAT AQUIRED PRIVATIZED LARGE-SCALE PUBLIC ENTERPRISES
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1. Teléfonos de México Telephone Grupo Carso (10.4%) Carlos Slim Helu
operations South Western Bell (U.S., 5%)
France Cable and Radio (France, 5%)
Sindicatos de Telefonistas de Rep. Mex.
(4.4%)
2. Mexicana de Cobre Mining Fomento Indus. del Norte de México Grupo Industrial Minera México
Mexicana de Acido Surfúrico Mining
3. Red Nacional de Televisión TV broadcasting Grupo Radio Televisora del Centro Ricardo Salinas Priego
Televisión de Chihuahua TV broadcasting Hugo Salinas Rocha
Cía. Operadora de Teatros Movie theaters Hugo Salinas Price
Estadios América Movie studios Alberto & Moises Saba
4. Aseguradora Mexicana Insurance Grupo Financiero Mexival-Banpais Angel Rodríguez Sáez
Aseguradora Hidalgo Insurance
5. Cía. Minera de Cananea Mining Mexicana de Cananea Grupo Industrial Minera México
Union Miniere (Belgium)
6. Siderúrgica Lázaro Cárdenas Iron and steel Siderúrgica de Pacífico Grupo Villacero
Las Truchas Enrique Cimet
Coutinho Caro Co. (U.S.)
Grupo Caribbean Ispat (India)
7. Fertilizantes Mexicanos Fertilizer prod.
Unids. Inds. Bajio, Camargo, Sind. de Trab. de la Ind. Quim. Petroquim.
Minatitlán Carboquim. Similares y Conexos de la Rep.
Mex. CTM
Unid. Ind. Pajaritos Agro Inmuebles, Agrofosfotados,
Agronitrogenados, Agroadministración
Unid. Ind. Lázaro Cárdenas Grupo Empresarial del Bajio
Unid. Ind. Torreón Fertirey Industrias Peñoles
Unid. Ind. Coatzacoalcos Servicios y Materiales Industriales de
Unid. Ind. Guadalajara Minatitlán
Primary Subscribers and
Subscribing Enterprises
in the Aquiring Entities
Aquiring EntitiesaField ofActivitiesNo. / Enterprise Names
TABLE I (Continued)
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Aquiring EntitiesaField ofActivitiesNo. / Enterprise Names
Unid. Ind. Monclova Efrain Dávalos Padilla
Nitroamonia de México
Unid. Ind. Salamanca Velpol
Unid. Ind. Querétaro Agrogen, Promotora Inmobiliaria Mérida
8. CONASUPO
Trigo Industrializado CONASUPO Wheat milling
Leche Industrializado CONASUPO Milk products
Unid. Ind. Aguascalientes Operadora de Lacteos de Aguascalientes
Unid. Ind. Delicias Operadora de Lacteos de Delicias
Industrias CONASUPO Food processing
Planta Tultitlán Unilever (U.K., Holland)
Planta Monterrey 1 Agroindustrias Integradas del Norte
Planta Nuevo Laredo, Mexicali Hidrogenadora Nacional Grupo Xacur
Maiz Industializado CONASUPO  Corn milling Promotora Empresar. de Occidente (80%) Raymondo Gómez Flores
Fideicomiso Molinero (10%)
Conf. Nac. de Productores Rurales (10%)
9. Ingenios Sugar refining
Calipam, Plan de San Luis, Consorcio Industrial Escorpión Enrique Molina Sobrino (Grupo
San Cristóbal Embotellador Mexicano)
Queseria, Ponciano Arriaga, Grupo Beta San Miguel Eneko Belausteguigoiti
Fco. Ameca, Alvaro Obregón
José Maria Martínez, Lázaro Consorcio Industrial Sucrum Juan Gallardo Thurlow (Grupo
Cárdenas, Independencia, El Embotelladoras Unidas)
Dorado
Melchor Ocampo, San Sebastian, Unión de Productores de Cana, CNC
Santa Clara
Alianza Popular, Pedernales, Ingenios Santos
Puruaran
Emiliano Zapata Molienda Industrial Azucarera Pablo & Israel Brener
San Gabriel Veracruz, Grupo de Inversionistas de Anermmex
Cuatotolapam, Plan de Ayala
Puga Consorcio Aga
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10. Aeronaves de México Airline services Icaro Aerotransportes Gerardo de Prevoisin
Pedro Cerisola
Carlos Abedrop Dávila
Enrique Robinson Bours
Bancomer
Aeroméxico pilots labor union
11. Altos Hornos de México Iron and steel Grupo Acerero del Norte Xavier Autrey
Alonso Ancira
Hoogovens (Holland)
Mission Energy Co. (U.S.)
Grupo IMSA
Grupo Industrial Alfa
12. Consorcio Minero B. J. Mining Grupo Acerero del Norte Xavier Autrey
Peña Colorada Alonso Ancira
Hoogovens (Holland)
Mission Energy Co. (U.S.)
Grupo IMSA
Grupo Caribbean Ispat
13. Cía. Mexicana de Aviación Airline services Grupo Xabre Pablo & Israel Brener
Carlos Abedrop Dávila
Chase Manhattan Bank (U.S.)
Isaac Becker
James Goldsmith
Isaac Saba family
Erias & Eduardo Sacal
14. Tereftalatos Mexicanos Petrochemicals Petrocel  Grupo Industrial Alfa
15. Grupo DINA Buses, trucks, &
automotive
parts
Plásticos Automotrices Kelpie Industries de México (Australia)
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Motores Perkins Workers union of the company
Moto Diesel Mexicana Grupo Ruvesa
Plásticos Automotrices Consorcio G Gómez Flores family
Dina Motores Consorcio G Covarrubias Valenzuela family
Dina Camiones Consorcio G Peña Méndez family
Dina Autobuses Consorcio G Casa de Bolsa Multivalores
16. Mexinox Metal Ahorroinox Thyssen (Germany)
processing
17. Grupo Industrial NKS Metal Promotora de Empresas GM
processing
18. Minera Real de Angeles Mining Promotora Frisco Grupo Carso
Minera Lampazos Mining Empresas Frisco Grupo Carso
Química Fluor Chemicals Empresas Frisco Grupo Carso
19. Const. Nac. de Carros de Railroad cars Bombardier (Canada)
Ferrocarrilres manuf.
20. Petroleos Mexicanos
Cía. Operadora de Ext. de Serv. Gasoline stat. Hidrosina
Hules Mexicanos Rubber DESC, Sociedad de Fomento Industrial
21. Servicio de Telerreservaciones Sertel
22. Cía. Minera Autlán Mining Grupo Ferrominero Serv. Financ. Promot. de
Empresas Arzac
Grupo Minero
B y Regiomet
23. Astilleros Unidos de Veracruz Ship const. Sokana Industries
24. Turboreactores Service indus. Corporación Mexicana de Aviación
25. Tubacero Mining Joseph Woldenberg
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26. Productos Pesqueros de Sinaloa Fishing indus. Mexabre  Pablo & Israel Brener
Pesquera del Pacífico Fishing indus.
Product. Pesque. de Matancita Fishing indus.
Product. Pesque. de Topolobampo Fishing indus.
27. Fermentaciones Mexicanos Chemicals Kyowa Hakko Kogyo Co. (Japan)
Sumitomo Corp. (Japan)
28. Cía. Industrial de Atenquique Paper manuf. Grupo Industrial Durango
29. Rassini Rheen Automotive Corporación Industrial Sanluis
parts
30. Manufacturas Gargo Packing Grupo Sonoco de México (U.S.)
materials
31. Hoteles el Presidente Hotel & Turnal Robinson Bour brothers
restaurants Jeronimo Arango
Antonio Gutiérrez Prieto
Carlos Abedrop Dávila
32. Algodonera Comercial Mexicana Distribution Industria Algodonera Mex.
Grupo Algodar
33. Pescados Industriales de Fishing indus. Pescados Industrializados
Mazatlán
34. Tabacos Mexicanos Cigarettes
Planta Desvenadora de Tabaco Tabacos Desvenados Cigarros La Tabacalera
L. Cárdenas Mexicana (Grupo Carso)
35. Alimentos Balanceados de México Animal feed
Planta Chihuahua Semillas Agrícolas Balanceadas de México Isaac Saba Raffoul
36. Alimentos del Fuerte Food processing
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Subscribing Enterprises
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Aquiring EntitiesaField ofActivitiesNo. / Enterprise Names
37. Nueva Nacional Textil Textiles Confederación de Trabajadores Mexicanos
Manufacturera
38. Torres Mexicanos Metal processing
39. Fundiciones de Hierro e Acero Metal processing
40. Mecánica Falk Machinery
41. Turbinas y Equipos Industriales Machinery
Sources: For enterprise names, “Las empresas más importantes de México,” Expansión: Aug. 21, 1985; Aug. 20, 1986; Aug. 19, 1987; Aug.
17, 1988; Aug. 16, 1989; Aug. 15, 1990; Aug. 21, 1991; and Aug. 19, 1992. The author also added public enterprises which she considered to
be important because of their selling price and their importance to the national economy. For information on privatization, (1) [13, pp. 169–
99]; (2) El financiero: Oct. 30, 1985; July 13, 1987; Aug. 30, Oct. 19 and 24, Nov. 1 and 25, Dec. 7, 1988; Aug. 23, 1989; June 5, Aug. 21,
Nov. 4 and 21, Dec. 11, 1990; Apr. 23, Nov. 25 and 26, 1991; May 8, June 25, Aug. 27, Oct. 7 and 16, Dec. 4, 1992; Feb. 11, Mar. 10 and 15,
June 10 and 16, July 19, Sept. 20, Oct. 4, 5, and 8, 1993; (3) Expansión, Jan. 17, Nov. 7, 1990; (4) Mercamétrica Ediciones, ed., Industridata
empresas grandes 1991 (Mexico City, 1991); (5) Instituto Nacional de Estadística Geografia e Informática, Sistema de Cuentas Nacionales de
México, Cuentas de producción del sector público, 1980–1988 (Mexico City, 1990); and (6) El mercado de valores, Feb. 1, 1988.
Notes: 1. The enterprises in the table are the public enterprises ranked in the list of the top 200 enterprises found in “Las empresas más
importantes de México,” Expansión, Aug. 21, 1985–Aug. 19, 1992. The author has also added public enterprises not included in
Expansión’s list, but which she felt were important public enterprises. Not in the table are enterprises that were subsidiaries of
other enterprises but which were not subject to privatization. Conversely, subsidiaries that were not in the list of 200 companies but
which were subject to privatization have been put into the table. In cases where an enterprise was not privatized as a unit, but was
broken up and its plants privatized separately, the small-scale plants have not been included in the table.
2. Where blank rows appear in the table, the author was unable to obtain the necessary information.
a
 The ratio of acquisition and nationality of foreign investor are shown in parentheses.
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in its privatization program. The second reason is that Mexican entrepreneurs and
investors have had the capacity to cope financially with the challenge of
privatization. This point will become clearer below when we examine the charac-
teristics of the Mexican investors who acquired public enterprises.
The Mexican individuals and enterprises that acquired public enterprises can
essentially be divided into those already prominent prior to privatization and those
that have newly arisen to prominence. Cases where the former were the sole enti-
ties making the acquisition were: No. 2, acquired by Grupo Industrial Minera
México (IMMSA); No. 7, by Peñoles which acquired a portion of the plants only;
No. 9, acquired by Grupo Embotellador Mexicano (GEMEX), Grupo
Embotelladoras Unidas (GEUSA), and Aga, all which acquired a portion of the
plants only; No. 11, by the Alfa group which acquired some subsidiaries only; No.
14, by Alfa; No. 20, by DESC, Sociedad de Fomento Industrial, S.A. de C.V.
(DESC) which acquired a portion of the subsidiaries only; and No. 29, by Sanluis.
The entities involved in the above acquisitions represent Mexico’s preeminent in-
digenous business groups. With the exception of No. 29, all acquired public enter-
prises in sectors connected with each groups established business.
Acquisitions that were carried out by leading enterprises and entrepreneurs in
alliance with others were: Nos. 3 and 6 where a portion of the subsidiaries only
were acquired, and Nos. 11 and 12 where a portion of the stockholdings only were
acquired. The founding family of the discount shop chain, Eléctrika, obtained the
assistance of the Saba family in the acquisition of No. 3 [5, July 19, 1993]. The
medium-sized iron and steel company, Villacero, formed an alliance with other
entrepreneurs involved in the iron and steel industry and with foreign-owned enter-
prises in the acquisition of No. 6 [5, September 9, 1991] [5, November 25, 1991]
[4, December 22, 1992, pp. 78–80]. For Nos. 11 and 12 where a portion of the
stockholdings only were acquired, the Autrey family, the founding family of the
pharmaceutical company, Casa Autrey, formed a consortium with foreign-owned
enterprises involved in iron and steel and with the indigenous business group,
Grupo IMSA, to make the acquisition [5, November 25, 1991]. No. 6 was the ac-
quisition of a public enterprise in a sector connected with the purchasers’ existing
business; Nos. 3, 11, and 12 were acquisitions which took the purchasing entities
into new fields of business.
Turning next to a discussion of the acquisitions made by newly-rising entrepre-
neurs and enterprises, acquisitions where these entities were the sole buyers were:
Nos. 4, 9 (a portion of the plants), 18, 26, 34 (a portion of the plants), and 35 (a
portion of the plants) were acquired. The purchaser of No. 4, Grupo Financiero
Mexival-Banpais, was reorganized after its predecessor, Grupo Financiero
Mexival (which was organized around the securities company, Mexival) acquired
the Banpais Bank [5, June 18, 1991] [5, November 20, 1993]. A subsidiary of the
newly formed Grupo Carso acquired No. 18 and a portion of the plants of No. 34;
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the Brener brothers acquired No. 26 and a portion of the plants of No. 9; while the
Saba family, already mentioned in connection with No. 3, acquired a portion of the
plants of No. 35. The Grupo Carso, Brener brothers, and Saba family not only
acquired their public enterprises solely on their own, but they also participated in
the consortium of entrepreneurial investors discussed below.
Acquisitions by the consortium of new entrepreneurial investors and enterprises
were: Nos. 1, 8 (only Maiz Industializado CONASUPO; hereafter MICONSA), 10,
13, and 15 (a portion of the subsidiaries only) were acquired. The above-mentioned
new group, Carso, was central in the acquisition of No. 1, and as was noted earlier
it formed a consortium with an American and a French telephone company [5,
December 10, 1990]. Central figures in the acquisition of No. 8 (MICONSA) and
No. 15 (a portion of the subsidiaries only) were the Gómez Flores brothers who
have their base in the city of Guadalajara in Jalisco State. In the acquisition of
MICONSA, a corn milling concern, the brothers formed a consortium with up-
stream and downstream producers in the industry, the former being a national syn-
dicate of small farmers (Confederación de Productores Rurales) and the latter a
syndicate of tortilla producers (Fideicomiso Molinero) [5, October 5, 1993]. In the
acquisition of a portion of the subsidiaries of No. 15, the brothers joined up with
another leading family in Guadalajara and with Multivalores, a securities company
[4, January 17, 1990, p. 48]. The Gómez Flores brothers also went together with
Multivalores in the acquisition of Banca Cremi, as will be mentioned later [5, June
24, 1991]. In the acquisition of No. 10, which was an airline company, the former
banker Carlos Abedrop Dávila, and other entrepreneurial investors headed by
Gerardo de Prevoisin formed a consortium with Bancomer (which was still a na-
tionalized bank at the time) and the airline pilots labor union [4, February 15, 1989,
p. 26]. In the acquisition of No. 13, also an airline company, the central figures
were the above-mentioned Brener brothers, as well as Carlos Abedrop Dávila and
the Chase Manhattan Bank; individual foreign and domestic investors also pro-
vided capital subscriptions. The noteworthy feature of acquisitions by new entre-
preneurs and enterprises was that they all (with the exceptions of Nos. 4, 18, and
34) were ventures into new fields of business for the acquiring entities. In the case
of No. 18, the buyer had been a minority shareholder prior to privatization who
then purchased government held shares to become the majority holder. Nos. 4 and
34 were acquisitions in business sectors related to those of the acquiring investors.
B. Entities That Acquired Banks
The entities that acquired the eighteen banks shown in Table II can be divided
largely into those that are securities companies and financial groups (grupo
financiero) organized around securities companies and those that do not belong to
the above groups. The only exceptions were the acquisitions of Nos. 6, 12, 17, and
18. No. 6 was acquired by the business group led by Roberto González Barrera,
TABLE II
ENTITIES THAT ACQUIRED PRIVATIZED BANKS
1. Banco Nacional Grupo Financiero Banamex-Accival Roberto Hernández Ramírez Lorenzo Zambrano, Max Michel, Angel
de México Alfredo Harp Helu Lozada, Enrique Molina, and others—
José Aguilera Medrano approx. 9,000 local investors
2. Bancomer Valores de Monterrey Eugenio Garza Lagüera Alberto Bailleres, Max Michel, José
(later became Grupo Financiero Eduardo A. Elizondo Lozano Calderón, Bernardo Elosua, and others—
 Bancomer) Ricardo Guajardo Touche approx. 5,000 local investors
3. Banca Serfin Grupo Financiero OBSA Gastón Luken Aguilar Claudio X. González, Crecencio Ballesteros,
Octavio Igartua Araiza Bernardo Garza, Antonio Madero,
Prudencio López, and others—approx.
2,000 investors
4. Multibanco Grupo Financiero Inverlat Agustín F. Legorreta Approx. 4,000 investors nationwide
Comermex Guillermo Sotil Achutegui
5. Banca Mexicano Grupo Financiero Inverméxico Carlos Gómez y Gómez Pablo Aramburuzabala, Alberto Santos,
Somex Manuel Somoza Manuel Senderos, and others—approx.
José Manuel González 2,000 investors nationwide
6. Banco Mercantil Roberto González Barrera
del Norte Rodolfo Barrera Villareal
Alberto Santos de Hoyos
7. Banco Grupo Financiero Privado Mexicano Antonio del Valle Ruiz More than 1,000 entrepreneurs and investors
Internacional Eduardo Berrondo Avalos nationwide
Blanca del Valle Perochena
8. Banco del Grupo Financiero GBM-Atlántico Alonso de Garay Gutiérrez Enrique Rojas, Jorge Larrea, and approx. 600
Atlántico Jorge Rojas Mota Velasco other investors in Mexico, D. F. and the
states of Nuevo Leon, Jalisco, Chihuahua,
Sonora, Tamaulipas, Guanajuato, Morelos;
and others—approx. 1,200 local investors
9. Banoro Estratégia Bursátil (securities co.) Rodolfo Esquer Lugo Approx. 600 investors mainly from
Fernando Obregón González northwestern Mexico
Juan Antonio Beltran López
4
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10. Banca Promex Valores Finamex (securities co.; Eduardo A.Carrillo Díaz Approx. 300 investors
later became Grupo Financiero Mauricio López Velasco
Promex Finamex) José Méndez Fabre
11. Banca Confia Abaco Casa de Bolsa (securities Jorge Lankenau Rocha Approx. 3,000 investors mainly from
co.; later became Abaco Grupo José Maiz Mier Monterrey
Financiero) Humberto Garza González
12. Banca B.C.H.  (Later became Grupo Financiero Carlos Cabal Peniche Approx. 3,500 investors mainly from the
BCH) Manuel Cantarel Méndez states of  Chiapas, Tabasco, and Campeche
13. Banco del Multiva Grupo Financiero Hugo S. Villa Manzo
Centro Luis Felipe Cervantes Coste
14. Banca Cremi Multivalores (securities co.; Hugo S. Villa Manzo Entrepreneurs from Jalisco State
later withdrew Multivalores and Juan A. Covarrubias Valenzuela
became Grupo Financiero Cremi) Omar Raymundo Gómez Flores
15. Multibanco Grupo Financiero Probursa José Madriaga Lomelín Approx. 3,000 investors nationwide
Mercantil Jorge Martínez Guitrón
de México José Martínez Guitrón
16. Banpais Grupo Financiero Mexival Julio C. Villarreal Guajardo Approx. 200 Jewish investors in Mexico, D.
Policarpo Elizondo Gutiérrez F. and the states of Nuevo Leon and
Fernando P. del Real Ibáñez Tamaulipas
17. Banco de (Later became Grupo Financiero Roberto Alcantara Rojas Approx. 60 investors in Guanajuato State and
Crédito Bancrecer) Carlos Mendoza Guadarrama Mexico, D. F.
y Servicio Ruben Goldberg
18. Banco de (Later became Grupo Financiero Marcelo Margain Berlanga Investors in northern and central Mexico
Oriente Margen)
Sources: (1) “Grupo financiero, la gestación,” Expansión, Jan. 22, 1992; (2) El financiero: June 11, June 18, June 24, Aug. 27, Oct. 29, Nov.
19, 1991; Jan. 27, Feb. 11, Apr. 13, Apr. 24, June 15, June 29, July 7, 1992; and (3) [13, pp. 200–204].
TABLE II (Continued)
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owner and director of Maseca, a Monterrey-based business group milling cornflour
and producing tortillas [5, June 15, 1992]. No. 12 was acquired by a new business
group led by Carlos Cabal Peniche with operations in Tabasco and other southern
states [5, November 19, 1991].
The acquiring securities companies and financial groups organized around secu-
rities companies can be divided into two groups based on whether or not their
heads were bankers before the country’s banks were nationalized in 1982. The
groups that acquired Nos. 2, 3, 4, 7, and 9 were headed by former bankers: No. 2
was acquired by the banking group that had owned and operated the Banca Serfin
until 1982 [7, pp. 142–48]; No. 3, by a consortium formed between part of the
banking group that had owned and operated the Banco Nacional de México
(Banamex) and the banking group that had owned and operated Banpais [7, pp.
148–53]; No. 4, by the other part of banking group that had owned and operated the
Banamex; and No. 7, by the banking group that had owned and operated Banco de
Crédito y Servicio (BANCRESER) [5, September 17, 1990] [4, December 19,
1992, p. 398]. The acquisition of banks other than those listed above were for the
most part undertaken by entrepreneurial and investor groups led by new entrepre-
neurs who arose from the securities business.
The above presentation provides and overview of the individuals and enterprises
that bought up Mexico’s major public enterprises. The next section will take a
closer look at the backgrounds of these buyers and relate them to the overall move-
ment of the Mexican economy in the 1980s. In this way we can study the interac-
tion that took place between privatization and the restructuring of the private sec-
tor.
IV. PRIVATIZATION AND THE RESTRUCTURING
OF THE PRIVATE SECTOR
From the examination presented in the above section, it can be seen that the entities
that acquired public enterprises can be divided largely into two categories. One is
made up of enterprises and entrepreneurs prominent before privatization and which
formed the core of indigenous business groups; also in this category are entrepre-
neur groups that owned and operated banks prior to nationalization. These entities
grew up under Mexico’s policy of import substitution and became important play-
ers supporting this policy. The other category is made up of new entrepreneurs and
enterprises that arose during the restructuring of the private sector in the 1980s.6
The remainder of this section will for the most part examine the former bankers and
banking groups and the new entrepreneurs and enterprises in the second category.
6 This author has already dealt with the indigenous groups in the first category in another study
which examined their makeup and the factors promoting their growth (see [6]), and these will not
be dealt with here.
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A. The Rise of New Entrepreneurial Forces
The new entrepreneurs and enterprises that rose to prominence during the 1980s
fall into two groups. One is made up of those that arose during the early and mid-
1980s and used privatization as an opportunity to further enhance their position.
The other group comprises new entrepreneurs and enterprises that took the oppor-
tunity offered by privatization itself to rise to eminence. Examples in the first group
are (1) the business group, Carso, (2) the Brener brothers, and (3) entrepreneurs
who rose up in the securities business and came to head a financial group. Ex-
amples from the second group are the Gómez Flores brothers and Carlos Cabal
Peniche.
1. Acquisitions that took advantage of bank nationalization and the securities
boom
We will first look at the rise of entrepreneurs and enterprises in the first group.
Two prominent events in the history of Mexico’s economy were instrumental in
their rise. One was the nationalization of the banks in the early 1980s, and the other
was the securities investment boom during the latter half of the 1980s. The first
group of entrepreneurs and enterprises were those that rose to prominence by skill-
fully using the opportunities produced by these two events.
In 1982 the government nationalized the private banks in an effort to prevent the
country’s external debt problem from destabilizing the economy. Soon after na-
tionalization, the government paid large compensations to the old stockholders
while simultaneously selling shares in the enterprises that were affiliated with the
newly nationalized banks. Many of these affiliated enterprises were among
Mexico’s leading companies, and the sale of shares in these enterprises brought
about a substantial shift in the makeup of their ownership. Many of the investors
who had previously held shares in the big banks used their compensation payments
to buy back the securities companies and other financial institutions that had been
affiliated with the banks. They shifted the center of action over to the securities
exchange market which the government had been seeking to nurture and
strengthen. The banking groups that have used the latest reprivatization program to
reacquire banks were these former holders of banking shares who were instrumen-
tal in bringing on the 1980s securities investment boom and making the stock mar-
ket a central player in the Mexican economy. Some of these former bankers have
joined up as investors with newly influential entrepreneurs and their business
groups and now take part in their business operations.
By joining former banking groups, the securities business sector gained new
strength, and during the latter half of the 1980s this sector experienced an unprec-
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edented business boom.7 This boom was caused in part by the enormous quantity of
bonds which, as already noted, were issued by the government to finance its swell-
ing deficit. It was also fueled by the huge amount of capital that flowed into the
stock market. This was money that flowed back into Mexico after fleeing abroad
during the first half of the 1980s, or which had been deposited in banks until their
nationalization, or surplus capital held by companies which saw no other attractive
investment opportunities because of the depressed economy [9, p. 514]. Both the
government’s enormous bond issue and the huge inflow of capital were products of
the economic crisis brought on by the country’s external debt problem, and in this
sense the securities boom was the offspring of Mexico’s economic crisis.
The entrepreneurs and enterprises in the first group were those that grabbed the
opportunities offered by bank nationalization and the securities boom. Nationaliza-
tion altered the ownership structure of large-scale enterprises, and the securities
boom opened the way for new entrepreneurs to acquire these enterprises and to
bring in former bank shareholders as investors. The new entrepreneurs and enter-
prises in the first group reaped enormous profits on their stock investments which
led to their quick growth and rapid rise to prominence. Two examples which will
be described below are the business group, Carso, and Grupo Financiero Banamex-
Accival.
Carso is a holding company set up in 1980. Immediately from the time it was set
up, it began buying up one after another large-scale manufacturing and commercial
enterprises listed on the Mexican Stock Exchange, and within a short period of
time the company grew into one of Mexico’s leading business groups.8 This ag-
gressive purchasing of companies earned Carso’s president, Carlos Slim Helu, the
nickname, “the genius of takeovers” [4, October 14, 1992, p. 184].
The nationalization of the banks and the securities investment boom during the
1980s were instrumental in Carso’s rapid growth. Major shareholders in the old
banks are now investors in Carso. One example is the Cosio Ariño brothers, who
were the top stockholders in Banamex before its nationalization and who were also
large shareholders in Bancomer. They now frequently turn up as consejero (board
of director members) for Carso subsidiaries. One of Carso’s subsidiaries, Seguros
7 Taking the rate of transactions on the stock exchange in 1984 as 100, these rose to 101 in 1985, 146
in 1986, 230 in 1987, 475 in 1988, and 480 in 1989 (calculated at 1978 prices), indicating the
explosive growth the securities market experienced [7, p. 158].
8 The purchased enterprises (and the dates of purchase) were as follows: Cigarros La Tabacalera
Mexicana (date unknown), Artes Gráficas Unidas (1984), Seguros de México (1984 and 1985),
Sanborn Hermanos (1985), Industrias Nacobre (1985), Porcelanite (1985), Fábricas de Papel
Loreto y Peña Pobre (1985 or 1986), Bicicletas de México (1986 or 1987), Empresas Frisco
(1987), Cía. Hulera Euzkadi (1989), and Grupo Condumex (1992). Dates of purchase determined
from [5, July 7, 1991] [5, July 28, 1992] [4, May 29, 1985, p.27] as well as from the subsidiaries’
major shareholders (1976–79) and from changes in the composition of the boards of directors. The
major shareholders in the subsidiaries and the composition of their boards of directors are shown in
[1, various issues] (for dates up to 1985) and [2, various issues] (for dates from 1986).
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de México, originally was named Seguros Bancomer, and had been a Bancomer
subsidiary. Another Carso subsidiary, Empresa Frisco, also had once been under
Bancomer. Both of these subsidiaries were repurchased by Julio Espinosa Iglesias,
Bancomer’s top stockholder until nationalization. He financed his repurchases us-
ing the compensation money he had received from the government, then later sold
both companies to Carso [4, May 29, 1985, p. 184]. Thus Carso has in part inher-
ited the investors and businesses of Bancomer.
The parent organization at the center of the Carso group is the securities com-
pany, Inversora Bursátil, and it was this company that reaped the benefits of the
1980s securities investment boom. Like the entrepreneurs who lead the other
newly prominent financial groups, Carlos Slim Helu emerged from the securities
world [5, June 22, 1990]. He is the cousin of Alfredo Harp Helu, one of the heads of
Grupo Financiero Banamex-Accival, the other example of a fast-growing enter-
prise which we will now turn to.
Like Carso, Grupo Financiero Banamex-Accival is organized around a securi-
ties company, Acciones y Valores de México (Accival), which was set up in 1971.
At the time Banamex was acquired, the group was made up of seven currency
exchange and investment companies. The group is presently headed by Roberto
Hernández Ramírez and Alfredo Harp Helu, both of whom have long been active
in the securities business [4, January 22, 1992, pp. 33–34]. Both Hernández and
Harp have served as president of the Mexican Stock Exchange, the former from
1974 to 1979 and the latter from 1988 to 1990.
An important factor for Accival’s rapid growth, and particularly for its ability to
acquire Banamex, Mexico’s largest bank, was the securities investment boom. The
boom brought the group huge returns on its stock transactions which was evident
from the phenomenal growth in Accival’s net profits after 1986 [7, p. 141]. There
can be little doubt that this inflow of money was one source for the capital used to
acquired Banamex. The securities investment boom also greatly increased
Accival’s ability to procure capital. A massive volume of foreign and domestic
funds flowed into the stock market, and it was the securities companies that were
the channel to this market. If investors did not have enough capital of their own for
acquisitions, they only had to tie up with numerous other investors in the market to
be able to procure the huge sums of money needed.9 The reasons for Accival’s
remarkable rise among the many securities companies were its business perfor-
mance and the outstanding abilities of its management.10
9 Lorenzo Zambrano, head of Mexico’s largest cement company Cementos Mexicanos, Max
Michel, head of the major department store Liverpool, and Enrique Molina, head of the big soft
drink producer GEMEX (whose names are in the column under “capital subscribers” in Table II)
are representative of Mexico’s entrepreneurial class.
10 The economics journal, Expansión, selects a “Man of Expansion” each year based on its assess-
ment of an entrepreneur’s activities. Hernández and Harp were selected as the “Men of Expansion”
for 1992 based on their acquisition of Banamex. One of the reasons for their selection was their
“superb ability at integrating widespread investor groups” [4, January 22, 1992, p. 34].
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Like Carso and Accival, the Brener brothers are another example of entrepre-
neurs who acquired public enterprises and rose to prominence through their skillful
handling of business opportunities produced by the new ownership arrangements
that followed nationalization of the banks and the securities boom. As shown in
Table I, the brothers are investors in Nos. 9, 13, and 26. They began their careers in
the beef processing business. In the 1980s they sold this business to the Alfa group,
and used the money they gained from the sale to buy up a number of other compa-
nies, one of which was the securities company, Comercial Casa de Bolsa. The
brothers are speculator-type entrepreneurs who profit from the buying and selling
of enterprises, and most of the companies they purchase they later sell, including
their securities company which they sold in 1991 [4, April 12, 1989, pp. 28–29] [5,
February 8, 1993].
Another example is the Autrey family. As owners of the pharmaceutical com-
pany, Casa Autrey, the family is not a newcomer to the entrepreneurial world, but
they used the opportunity of the securities investment boom to rapidly move ahead
in their business. The family began to diversify its business interests in a step to
overcome the government’s price controls on pharmaceuticals. In 1984 it pur-
chased the securities company, Casa de Bolsa Bancomer, a subsidiary of
Bancomer, and renamed it Casa de Bolsa México. Then in February 1992 the fam-
ily cooperated with Grupo Financiero Inverlat in a capital subscription when the
latter acquired Multibanco Comermex.
2. Entrepreneurs and enterprises that took advantage of privatization itself
Looking at entrepreneurs and enterprises that used the privatization process it-
self as their opportunity to rise to prominence, there are the examples of the Gómez
Flores brothers and Carlos Cabal Peniche. The former acquired No. 8 (MICONSA)
and No. 15 (four subsidiaries) shown in Table I, and No. 14 in Table II. In addition
to these, the brothers also participated in the bidding for a mass media public enter-
prise that took place in July 1993, but their bid was unsuccessful [5, July 19, 1993].
Cabal Peniche acquired No. 12 in Table II.
The Gómez Flores brothers and Cabal Peniche have many points in common.
For instance, when submitting bids, both have joined forces with other entrepre-
neurs. In the case of the Gómez Flores brothers, however, they ended up with con-
trolling rights in all three of their acquired companies. In their acquisition of No. 8
in Table I, they put up 80 per cent of the capital subscription; in No. 15 they bought
up all of the shares from their cooperating partners following the acquisition [4,
March 17, 1993, p. 78]; and with No. 14 in Table II, their collaborator,
Multivalores, pulled out of the acquisition. For Cabal Peniche, collaboration has
been with entrepreneurs in his home base of Tabasco and the other states in south-
ern Mexico.
Another similarity is that by acquiring a public enterprise, both the Gómez
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Flores brothers and Cabal Peniche have succeeded in acquiring the status of promi-
nent businessmen virtually over night. There is very little information about the
background of all these men. It is said about the Gómez Flores brothers that they
acquired their wealth from housing construction for the general public and from
large-scale tract housing and industrial park development in Jalisco State [4, Sep-
tember 17, 1993, p. 76]. Cabal Peniche is said to have run a business cultivating,
exporting, and processing bananas in the southern Mexican states of Tabasco,
Campeche, and Chiapas [5, October 14, 1991] [5, November 19, 1991]. But there is
no way that these obscure regional entrepreneurs could have raised on their own
the enormous amounts of capital needed for their acquisitions. Thus one would
have to suspect that large influential investors have provided financial backing.
Related to this point is a third similarity in the close connections the brothers and
Cabal Peniche have with powerful political figures in the ruling party, and which
the newspapers and other media frequently report on [12, March 22, 1993, p. 12]
[12, March 29, 1993, p. 14]. In this regard, however, they are not alone, as this can
be said about all of the businessmen and financiers who have acquired public enter-
prises.
Another interesting point about the Gómez Flores brothers and Cabal Peniche is
that following their public enterprise acquisitions, the two sides came together in a
joint business undertaking. In August 1992 Cabal Peniche brought together about
300 investors and bought up Del Monte Fresh Foods, a fresh fruit and vegetable
subsidiary owned by Del Monte of the United States, for U.S.$ 560 million. The
Gómez Flores brothers were among the capital subscribers who participated in this
venture [12, February 22, 1993, p. 13] [12, March 29, 1993, p. 14]. Then in August
1993 the two sides announced that arrangements had been worked out for the
merger of the Gómez Flores brothers’ Banca Cremi and Cabal Peniche’s Banca
B.C.H. (renamed the Banco Unión in 1993). However, Cabal Peniche was later
accused of involvement in illegal lending, and the merger failed to materialize.11
As can be seen from the above discussion, privatization produced major oppor-
tunities that opened the way for the rise of new entrepreneurial forces. In the next
part of this section we will look at the impact on private sector restructuring where
privatization opened the way for these new entrepreneurial forces to join the lead-
ership ranks of the private sector. For businessmen and bankers already established
within the leadership, privatization opened the way to further power and wealth
because it brought splendid opportunities for entering new business fields and re-
structuring old businesses.
11 In September 1994, Carlos Cabal Peniche was indicted on suspicion of having illegally provided a
large amount of financing to himself from Banca Unión using numerous ghost companies and
rented names [4, October 26, 1994, p. 44].
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B. Business Restructuring by Established Entrepreneurial Entities
1. Entry into new business fields
Entrepreneurs and enterprises already well established in their particular fields
took advantage of privatization to enter new fields of business. Among indigenous
business groups, notable examples were Sanluis, Eléctrika, and Maseca. Sanluis
was a business group specializing in mining, but at the start of the 1980s it began to
diversify its business operations. As part of this effort, it acquired a public enter-
prise in October 1988 that was involved in automotive parts manufacturing [4, June
10, 1992, p. 85]. Eléctrika is a discount store chain set up in 1950 by Hugo Salinas
Rocha, a member of the Salinas Rocha family which controls the commercial busi-
ness group, Salinas y Rocha. In July 1993 this family acquired a mass media public
enterprise. Another member of this family, Jorge Lankenau Rocha, is owner and
director of the securities company, Abaco Casa de Bolsa, which acquired bank No.
11 in Table II. The privatization program contributed greatly to the expansion of
the Salinas Rocha family’s business operations. Grupo Industrial Maseca, headed
by Roberto González Barrera, is Mexico’s largest corn miller and tortilla producer
[4, September 30, 1992, p. 48]. In 1992 this group acquired bank No. 6 shown in
Table II.
2. Restructuring of established enterprises
Many enterprises used the opportunity of the privatization program to restruc-
ture and strengthen their business operations. Examples which will be looked at
here were IMMSA, DESC, Alfa, GEMEX, and GEUSA.
IMMSA, an indigenous business group involved in mining, acquired two public
enterprises important in the copper mining business. These acquisitions gave
IMMSA control over 95 per cent of Mexico’s total copper production, giving the
group a virtual monopoly in the industry. The business group DESC had a subsid-
iary, Negro de Humos de México, which along with the public enterprise, Hules
Mexicanos, formed a duopoly producing all of Mexico’s carbon black, used in
rubberized reinforcing fillers. With the coming of privatization, DESC’s subsidiary
acquired the public enterprise which gave Negro de Humos de México a monopoly
over the production of this product. A similar situation came about in the produc-
tion of terephtlalic acid, used in synthetic fibers. The public enterprise, Tereftalatos
Mexicanos, together with Petrocel, a subsidiary of the Alfa group, maintained a
duopoly in the production of this acid. Following introduction of the privatization
program, Petrocel acquired its public enterprise competitor which gave Alfa a mo-
nopoly in the business [5, July 7, 1992]. At the same time Alfa also strengthened its
position in the iron and steel sector where its subsidiary, Hylsa, acquired a subsid-
iary belonging to Altos Hornos de México, a public enterprise operating in the iron
and steel industry.
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Another reason indigenous business groups acquired public enterprises was to
promote vertical integration and thereby strengthen their position in industries
where they already operated. Examples of this were business groups working in the
soft drinks industry which acquired sugar refineries for the production of raw
sugar. GEMEX, which holds a franchise from the PepsiCo, Inc. of the United
States, is the largest producer of Pepsi cola in Mexico. Including the three sugar
refineries shown under No. 9 in Table I, GEMEX acquired a total of six refineries
through privatization. It then bought up another four refineries from the Brener
brothers which they had earlier acquired through privatization. The acquisition of
these ten refineries gave GEMEX control of about one quarter of Mexico’s total
sugar production [5, July 19, 1993]. In addition to its sugar refinery acquisitions, in
1985 GEMEX also acquired Garci-Crespo, a public enterprise operating in the soft
drinks industry. This acquisition included all of the latter’s affiliates [4, June 10,
1992, p. 61]. GEUSA and Aga are two other examples of business groups in the
soft drinks sector that acquired sugar refineries.
C. The Restructuring of New Enterprises Following Privatization
Privatization of Mexico’s major public enterprises has been accomplished, and
the lineup of businessmen and companies within the leadership of the private sec-
tor has largely taken form. But this lineup remains unstable, especially among the
newly arisen enterprises where restructuring continues to take place, and it is ap-
parent that more time will be needed before the final makeup of this leadership is
determined.
This final section will deal with the restructuring that the newly arisen enter-
prises have been going through since the completion of privatization. The ex-
amples that will be looked at are: the tie-up between Aeroméxico and Mexicana de
Aviación in the airline service business, the merger of Banco Mercantil del Norte
with the securities company Casa de Bolsa Afin, the merger of Banoro with
BANCRESER, and the purchase of an Alfa group subsidiary by Grupo Industrial
Durango in the paper manufacturing industry.
The situation for Aeroméxico and Mexicana de Aviación was one where two
entrepreneurs joined forces to acquire the airline companies, then after the acquisi-
tions they carried out a stock swap which in effect brought the two companies
under a single management. This managerial tie-up between the two owners has
given them control over three quarters of Mexico’s airline service industry [5,
March 15, 1993].12 Agreement for the merger of Banco Mercantil del Norte and
12 Due largely to the slump in the airline business after the Persian Gulf War, the business tie-up
between the two airlines did not produce good results in the way of profits, and following the tie-
up, Mexicana’s losses actually increased. This problem was connected with the indictment of
Gerardo de Prevoisin, a promoter of the tie-up, on suspicion of having illegally used money be-
longing to Mexicana.
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Casa de Bolsa Afin was reached in July 1993. The former had been acquired by
Roberto González Barrera, an industrialist in the manufacturing sector, who
wanted to set up a financial group and make a genuine move into the financing
business but could not because he had no securities company under his control. The
merger of his bank with Afin made it possible for him to organize a financial group
[5, July 9, 1993]. The merger between Banoro and BANCRESER was agreed upon
in August 1993 [5, July 9, 1993]. Grupo Industrial Durango, which had earlier
acquired the paper manufacturer Cía. Industrial de Atentique through the
privatization program, bought up the Alfa subsidiary, Empaques de Carton Titan, a
corrugated box manufacturer, in December 1993. Durango’s aim in purchasing this
subsidiary was to have a secure buyer for its earlier acquisition’s production of raw
materials for the manufacture of cardboard boxes. Capital for financing the pur-
chase came from foreign as well as domestic banks [4, February 16, 1994, p. 42].
The ultimate result of restructuring, whether carried out by the newly prominent
or the long-established enterprises, was the further concentration of production.
This process is still continuing today.
V. CONCLUSION
This study examined the privatization of Mexico’s public enterprises in its rela-
tionship to the restructuring of the private sector during the 1980s. This examina-
tion showed that private sector restructuring resulted in the expansion of the private
sector, the entry of new entrepreneurs and their business groups into the leadership
ranks of the private sector, and the restructuring of both new and old businesses
together with an increase in industrial concentration. This relationship between
private sector restructuring and privatization was an extremely dynamic one with
private sector restructuring preparing the way for privatization while privatization
worked to push along private sector restructuring.
The first side of this relationship—private sector restructuring preparing the way
for privatization—can be summarized as follows.
(1) The entry of new entrepreneurial forces into the leadership ranks of the pri-
vate sector from the beginning until the mid-1980s played a part in expanding the
ranks of the entrepreneurs and business groups that became the prime actors who
later carried out the government’s privatization program. Important springboards
that propelled these new entrepreneurial forces to prominence were the national-
ization of the banks and the securities investment boom, and in this sense these new
forces were the offspring of Mexico’s economic crisis.
(2) In parallel with the rise of new entrepreneurial forces, former bankers during
the same period were being compelled to restructure their businesses because of
bank nationalization. This restructuring was instrumental in further expanding the
entrepreneurial ranks that carried out privatization. Some of these former bankers
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shifted their focus of business activity over to the securities exchange market.
Other ex-bankers allied themselves with newly rising entrepreneurs and their ex-
panding business groups. In both cases these former bankers became part of the
entrepreneurial ranks that carried forward the privatization program.
Looking next at the other side of the relationship—privatization worked to push
along private sector restructuring—this can be summarized as follows.
(1) Privatization ipso facto means expansion of the private sector.
(2) Privatization itself became the opportunity for new entrepreneurial forces to
rise to prominence. This has enabled them to enter the ranks of leadership in the
private sector. The important factors for their rise into these ranks were again the
nationalization of the banks and the securities investment boom. To acquire public
enterprises, an enormous amount of capital was required, and this requirement
spurred the widespread use of alliances among entrepreneurs and efforts to raise
capital subscriptions from investors. Nationalization of the banks and the securities
boom upset the established framework of relationships that had existed between
entrepreneurs and their enterprises and among entrepreneurs themselves, and this
unstable state made it easier to organize new entrepreneurial alliances. These alli-
ances were the mechanism that made it possible for new entrepreneurs and their
business groups to participate in the privatization process, and which led to their
rise as new entrepreneurial forces in the Mexican economy.
(3) Privatization brought the opportunity for both old and new entrepreneurs to
restructure their businesses. The long-established business groups restructured and
strengthened their preexisting business operations and at the same time ventured
into new business fields. Meanwhile, many of the newly established entrepreneurs
have restructured through mergers, a process which is still ongoing. This restruc-
turing by both groups has brought about greater industrial concentration within
Mexico’s private sector.
As mentioned in the Introduction of this study, Mexico’s privatization policy has
been highly successful even from an international perspective. The observations
presented in this study suggest that the achievement of this success was due to the
excellent dovetailing that took place between the speed and the composition of
restructuring in Mexico’s private sector and those in privatization. One could go
further and say that this fortunate situation made the success of Mexico’s
privatization program possible.
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